|   Lawyer's Dream or Correctional Administrator's Nightmare?
          This elaboration of remedies to vindicate prisoners' rights and ensure
        compliance with the law may seem to some readers a lawyer's dream come
        true: Independent Chairpersons for serious disciplinary cases; independent
        adjudicators for segregation, involuntary transfers, and visit reviews;
        grievance processes with binding arbitration; an administrative tribunal;
        judicial review; the Arbour remedy of revision of sentence. For correctional
        administrators, this scenario might seem to evoke a nightmare world in
        which their principal preoccupation is preparing for and appearing at
        a succession of proceedings in which their decisions are challenged and
        redress for alleged or perceived injustices is sought. In this world,
        prisoners would become full-time grievors/appellants, with no time left
        for participating in programs aimed at their rehabilitation.
          The way this array of remedies would operate in the real world bears
        little relationship to either the lawyer's dream or the correctional administrator's
        nightmare. In the recommendations I have made throughout this book, primary
        reliance for entrenching the Rule of Law and ensuring compliance with
        the law is on what lawyers call "first instance" processes. If disciplinary
        hearings, segregation reviews, and involuntary transfers are conducted
        with the appropriate balance between correctional expertise and independent
        adjudication, most cases will not proceed beyond this point. If the grievance
        process is underpinned by the possibility of independent binding arbitration,
        the incentive to resolve grievances at an early stage will ensure that
        only the exceptional case proceeds beyond there. In the same way, recourse
        to the administrative tribunal proposed by the Correctional Investigator
        would be reserved for those cases in which the CI has exhausted all other
        avenues in seeking to have the Service respond to his recommendations.
        Judicial review is not about second-guessing the decisions of correctional
        administrators; it interferes only when the decision is unreasonable or
        where there is a violation of the rules of procedural fairness and will
        not suddenly take over the agenda in wardens' offices. The judicial remedy
        proposed by the Arbour Report will be an even more exceptional event,
        because in most cases non-compliance with the law will not rise to a sufficient
        level of gravity to meet the threshold test of interfering with the integrity
        of the original sentence. In those exceptional cases, however, it will
        provide both an essential form of redress and a judicial indictment of
        the correctional practice which has made such redress necessary.
          A final issue that must be addressed in contemplating enlargement of
        the remedies for the vindication of prisoners' rights is the cost. The
        Correctional Investigator has suggested that an administrative tribunal
        would be cost-effective because, in providing parties with ongoing clarification
        of the law, it would avoid the needless expense of revisiting unresolved
        issues with the Correctional Service. In proposing her judicial remedy,
        Madam Justice Arbour acknowledged the additional burden this could place
        on the courts but made the trenchant observation, which can be applied
        to every remedy considered in this chapter, that any additional burden
        "would only be so in proportion to the Correctional Service's non-compliance
        with the law" (Arbour Report at 184). The reforms the Correctional Investigator,
        Madam Justice Arbour and I have proposed all seek to draw the operations
        of the Correctional Service of Canada into the gravitational pull of a
        culture that respects legal and constitutional rights. The more fully
        the Service brings itself within this legal orbit, the less need there
        will be for prisoners and the Correctional Investigator to seek redress.
          In Sector 1, I quoted from the 1977 report of the House of Commons Sub-committee
        on the Penitentiary System on the consequences, in the pre-  Martineau  
        era, of judicial non-intervention in the administration of justice in
        prisons. To recap: . . . The present judicial policy invites the perpetuation
        by the authorities of a system that is so far removed from normal standards
        of justice that it remains safely within the class of matters in which
        the imposition of judicial or quasi-judicial procedures would clearly
        be, in most instances, inconceivable . . . The worse things are in the
        penitentiary system, therefore, the more self-evident it is to the courts
        that Parliament could not possibly have intended for them to intervene.
        Injustice, as well as virtue, can be its own reward. (  Report
        to Parliament   at 86)     In a post-  Martineau,   post-  Charter,  
        post-  CCRA   era, it is now self-evident that
        outside intervention is a necessary prerequisite to the attainment of
        justice behind the walls. To turn the Sub-committee's comment on its head,
        if the Correctional Service of Canada does "good corrections" within the
        letter and spirit of the law, justice can be its own reward, in the form
        of avoiding prisoners' grievances, adverse reports from the Correctional
        Investigator, unnecessary appearances before administrative tribunals,
        and criticism from judicial reviews.
          For those who remain skeptical about the need for the expansion of remedies
        to vindicate the rights of prisoners, it may be helpful to reflect on
        the words of Mary Campbell. Ms. Campbell, as a senior official with the
        Secretariat to the Solicitor General, had an inside track in both the
        creation of the   CCRA   and the monitoring
        of its implementation. In commenting on the Arbour Report, she had this
        to say:
          The Arbour Report amply demonstrates the frailty
        of the recognition of inmates' rights in this country. Notwithstanding
        the years of litigation, policy development and legislative reform, the
        lack of a genuine commitment to a culture of human rights behind bars
        can swiftly return prison culture to the "dark ages" where expediency
        rules rather than the law. The answer is not to abandon the norms, but
        rather, as Arbour has recommended, to shore up the practices so as to
        bring them into line with the law and an acceptable standard of prisoners'
        rights . . .
         It is important to pay attention to how the Prison
        for Women abuses came to public attention: through   habeas
        corpus   application in the courts and through a special report by
        the Correctional Investigator which contradicted the findings of the Correctional
        Service's internal investigation. Consequently, when the argument is made
        that a strong, multi-facted legal framework is essential for the protection
        of inmates' rights, this means not just the substantive law but also the
        support mechanisms that allow that law to be monitored and tested in the
        open light of day. Had the women not had adequate access to the courts,
        had the Correctional Investigator not existed, the events at the Prison
        for Women might well have been simply one more anecdote in prison history
        behind the walls. (Mary E. Campbell, "Revolution" and Counter-Revolution
        in Canadian Prisoners' Rights" [1996] 2   Canadian
        Criminal Law Review   285 at 324)
          The remedial measures advanced in this chapter are intended to ensure
        that the experiences of Hughie MacDonald, Donnie Oag, Jason Gallant, Gary
        Weaver, and all the other prisoners whose cases I have chronicled do not
        become just further anecdotes in this history. Rather, they are offered
        as legal antidotes to the practice of injustice.   Page 1 of 1
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